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THE CORPORATION EXECUTIVE AND HIS
PROFIT-SHARING CONTRACT
By GEORGE T. WASHINGTONt
THE importance of good management to corporate enterprise has never
been more apparent than during the last few years of depression and
uncertainty. Executives of known ability are in a position to insist on
tenure and reward. At the same time, a board of directors which is
negotiating with a prospective manager is likely today to drive a harder
bargain than it might have in 1929. The directors want results for their
money; the executive wants a substantial reward for producing the desired
results. Accordingly, we find a very large number of corporations em-
ploying their executives under arrangements in which compensation is
largely contingent upon success.1 We find also that these arrangements
are being prepared with increasing care. The executive head of a large
corporation might formerly have been content to serve from year to year
on a salary fixed at the beginning of each year by simple resolution of
the directors. Today, he is likely to ask for a carefully prepared contract
giving him several years' tenure and a share of the company's profits.
The purpose of this Article is to examine the problems of drafting which
arise in this situation, and to discuss in some detail the provisions of
a number of contracts in actual use. While particular emphasis will be
placed upon profit-sharing clauses, consideration will be given to all of
the usual provisions of executives' employment contracts.
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
First, as to the substance of the arrangement. A fixed salary will
normally be required -a sum which the executive can count on in any
event.2 In addition, the parties will wish an "incentive" compensation.
t Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
1. BAKER, EXECUTIVE SALARIES AxND Bez:us PLANS (1938) 16 et seq., states that
executive bonus plans were seldom used prior to 1914; that in 1928 some 64% of a group
of companies studied had adopted such plans; that the depression curtailed the use of
bonus systems; and that the number functioning had fallen off substantially by 1932, the
latest date for which figures are given. Although the present writer cannot offer precise
statistics, his experience kads him to believe that the past three years have witnessed a
very widespread revival of the bonus system. Mr. Baker's book discusses compensation
arrangements from the econcmic rather than the legal point of view. However, like many
other books intended for the economist and business man, it has considerable value to the
lawyer, and will frequently be mentioned in the following pages. It is cited herein as
BAKEm
2. The Woolworth contracts, described infra note 17, are exceptional in providing
for no fixed salary. See BAKER, 190. The background of the Woolworth compensation
plan is sketched in WINYMER, FINv AND TEN (1940) 61, 106, 125-126, 137, 142.
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This "incentive" can take any one of a large number of forms: a cash
bonus, a stock bonus, an interest in an investment fund, or any combina-
tion of these. The measuring rod of the added compensation is usually
corporate earnings, dividends,3 sales,4 or some other significant figure.
The cash bonus based on a percentage of the company's earnings is one
of the most common forms of incentive compensation, and it is that
form which is the principal subject of this Article. In granting additional
compensation, the corporation may set up a "bonus fund," in which two
or more executives will share in designated proportions,5 or it may enter
into a separate contract with each executive who is to receive a percentage
of earnings.' Our discussion here will center about the latter alternative,
though the problems involved in drafting "bonus fund" contracts are
very similar, and will be referred to occasionally.'
3. See Eastman Kodak Co. plan, referred to in BAKER, 200, and revised Bethlehem
Steel Corp. plan, discussed in BAYER, 210.
4. Executives in charge of distribution are often granted additional compensation
based on increases in volume of sales. Compare the provisions of the Woolworth con-
tracts, infra noie 41.
5. Such funds are in common use. See BAKER, 209, 210, 214; Rogers v. Hill, 289
U. S. 582 (1933); Berendt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 108 N. J. Eq. 148, 154 Atl. 321
(1931) ; Gallin v. National City Bank, 152 Misc. 679, 273 N. Y. Supp. 87 (Sup. Ct. 1934),
s. c., 155 Misc. 880, 281 N. Y. Supp. 795 (Sup. Ct. 1935) (report of Referee). See also
bonus fund plan of Container Corp. of America, attached to proxy statement for stock-
holders' meeting of April 25, 1940. On the question of the application of INT. REV. CoDE
§ 165 to executives' bonus funds, see Reg. 101, Art. 165-1. For an investment fund plan,
see Coats v. General Motors Corp., 11 Cal. (2d) 601, 81 P. (2d) 906 (1938).
6. Bonus plans can, of course, be adopted in various ways. Baker, writing in 1938,
studied 30 large industrial companies with definite bonus plans (200, 201). These were
established in the following ways: sixteen by directors' resolution, six by contract with
executives, four by resolution and contract, three by by-law, one not reporting. Estab-
lishment by contract seems on the whole the most desirable method, as adoption through
by-law seems to impart too much rigidity, at least if the by-laws can be amended only by
stockholder action. Bonus plans should be flexible and subject to frequent review by the
directors. In any event, the executive's attorney will doubtless deem it advisable to have
his client's percentage arrangement embodied in a contract rather than in a by-law.
7. See note 45 in!ra, and note 5 supra. Occasionally, a corporation will contract
with a partnership or another corporation for the furnishing to it of executive manage-
ment. Thus, in 1928, Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., and Renraw, Inc., entered into a con-
tract whereby the former would pay to Renraw, Inc., certain sums for the services of
Harry M. Warner, Albert Warner and Jack L. Warner. For the text of this contract,
see Koplar v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 173, 179-182n. (D. Del. 1937);
cf. Sherman & Ellis, Inc. v. Indiana Mutual Casualty Co., 41 F. (2d) 588 (C. C. A. 7th,
1930); STEVENS, CORPORATIONS (1936) 558-559.
The possibilities of forms of incentive compensation other than those here discussed
should not, of course, be overlooked. Success of a particular plan depends upon the re-
quirements of the corporation's business. Compare BAKER, 245: "Plans doubtless should
be adapted to meet company and industrial needs . . . Satisfactory solutions in any area
will not be 'ready made' ones; rather they will be 'made to order.'" For example, the
stock option plan, among other advantages, offers the desirable feature of not requiring
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A cash bonus based on a percentage of earnings- the "percentage
participation" plan - is said by its proponents to offer a powerful in-
ducement to the management to increase the company's earnings. It is
argued that the corporation can cut its fixed expenses by offering to the
executives salaries of only moderate size, holding out as bait the prospect
of substantial bonuses dependent on the future success of the business.'
Stockholders, it is claimed, should be willing to pay a higher rate of
compensation if and when the corporation makes increased earnings.
Considerations such as these have led the courts to sustain the validity
of profit-sharing contracts, if properly adopted.9 Further, in corpora-
tions where ownership and active management are in different hands,
it might even be contended that the stockholders should receive only that
portion of the profits which is "sufficient to insure the continued supply-
ing of capital and taking of risk,"' 0 granting to management the re-
maining profits as a reward for efficiency, on the premise that the general
good is best served by encouraging profitable and efficient business enter-
prise."
That, at least, is one side of the picture. On the other side, there is
the fact that executives sometimes ask and obtain a "minimum" salary
that is unconscionably high, with the acquiescence of an indifferent or
controlled board of directors, and secure in addition an unduly large
percentage of the profits.' It is also true that business leaders often
the expenditure of corporate funds-in fact, it brings new funds to the business. An
incentive is provided by giving an option at higher prices than those presently prevailing,
so that if the market price of the company's stock rises (presumably through the man-
agement's good work for the corporation), the executive wvill find it advantageous to exer-
cise the option. See McQuillen v. National Cash Reg. Co., 27 F. Supp. 639 (D. Md.
1939); Baker, Stock Options For Executives (1940) 19 HARv. Bus. RLv. 106.
8. Baker offers data to refute this argument, concluding: "There is no evidence that
the use of bonus plans lowered the regular cash salaries paid executives. Instead there is
definite evidence that companies paying bonuses paid larger total compensation to their
officers than did non-bonus-paying companies." (222, 236). He also points out that
bonus-paying companies had a somewhat smaller decline in earnings in 1928-1932 than
did non-bonus-paying companies, but it seems doubtful that any significant trend is shown.
(40-41, 44, 69, 107).
9. See Putnam v. Juvenile Shoe Corp., 307 Mo. 74, 90, 269 S. IN. 593, 596 (1925);
Gray & Co. v. United States, 35 F. (2d) 968, 974 (Ct. Cl. 1929). As to the formalities
of adopting the contract, see Comment (1534) 32 MicH. L. RE'. 672. Corporations having
securities listed on a national securities exchange must observe Rule X-14A-1 of the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission, and particularly Schedule 14A, Section D, Item 7
of that Rule. See also Washington, The Corporation Execriti'e: His Living WJ'age,
shortly to be published in the Harvard Law Review.
10. See BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPOLATON AND PRIWuTE PRoET (1932)
342-343.
11. Compare O'LEARY, CORrORATE Er,,rmPRSE iN MoDma Ecoo.nOuc LIFE (1933)
37; BERLE & MRANS, op. cit. supra note 10, at 343, 350.
12. See NVoRMsER, FRANKENSTEIN, INCORPORLTED (1931) 115-123; Rms, FALSE SE-
CURITY (1937) 22-23.
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credit themselves with having produced the huge earnings of 1926-1929,
without accepting any responsibility for the falling off of earnings during
the depression. Be that as it may, prevailing business opinion awards
to management credit for earnings, however produced, and management
generally will not be satisfied unless it receives a share."8 It must be
admitted, of course, that a change of executives can make all the differ-
ence between a surplus and a deficit for an individual enterprise. Real
managerial ability is. something worth paying for, even though the execu-
tive may in fact be receiving a portion of an earnings increase due rather
to general business conditions (or, of late, to government contracts
awarded under the defense program) than to his own efforts.' 4 If an
attempt is made to limit the executive to a share of those profits which
he himself has helped to produce, experience shows that certain con-
tractual limitations may well be imposed.'
Assuming, then, that the parties have finally decided upon the per-
centage participation plan, and have reached an agreement upon the
precise amount of the fixed salary to be paid as well as the precise per-
centage of the profits which the executive is to receive,"0 let us turn to
the problems of draftsmanship presented.
DRAFTING THE CONTRACT
As has been indicated above, there is no "ideal" form of bonus con-
tract; the needs of the individual business must control the substance
and form of the final arrangement. As a compensation contract which
has worked out well in one business may be unsatisfactory in another,
it is inadvisable to rely too completely on any form of model contract,
With this caveat, it may be explained that the form which follows is
a composite, derived from several similar contracts in whose drafting
the present writer assisted. These contracts, which have proved satisfac-
tory in operation, were drawn for industrial corporations of medium size.
To provide a basis of comparison, the writer has obtained copies of the
13. It has been suggested that even where compensation to management is confined to
payment of large flat salaries, these rewards "should probably be looked upon as a form
of commuted profits . . ." O'LEARY, op. cit. supra note 11, at 29. See also Taussig &
Barker, American Corporations and Their Executives (Nov. 1925) 40 Q. J. EcoN. 1, 40.
14. BAKER, 227, lists numerous causes for increases in earnings, beyond the control
of management. See also O'LEARY, op. cit. supra note 11, at 36; KENNEDY, DIVENrDS To
PAY (1939) 114-135.
15. See pp. 52-54 infra.
16. On the subject of judicial review of the "reasonableness" of the compensation
paid to corporation executives, see Washington, The Corporation Executive: His Living
Wage, shortly to be published in the Harvard Law Review. This subject is noted in
(1931) 41 YALE L. J. 109, (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 419, (1933) 46 HtAv. L. REV. 828, (1934)
32 MicH. L. REv. 672.
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compensation contracts of the principal executives of certain large cor-
porations,1 7 to which reference will frequently be made.
17. The contracts referred to were obtained from the files of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission. The starting point was a list of 105 companies, given in the Ncw Re-
public for December 27, 1939, which were among the corporations reporting to the SEC
the payment of compensation of $25,000 or more to an officer or director in 1938. All of
these companies appear to have securities listed on national securities exchanges, and
are hence required to file registration statements with the SEC under the Securities E-x-
change Act of 1934. At the writer's request, the Commission examined its files to dis-
cover whether each of these companies had deposited a copy of the employment contract
of its principal executive, and reported that in eleven instances copies of such contracts had
been deposited. In the case of a twelfth company-F. W. Woolworth & Co.-the desired
contract was not available, but there had been deposited copies of form contracts entered
into by that company with certain of its officers. The Commission's search %%as made on
or about March 23, 1940; a further search was made on or about July 23, 1940, bringing
up to that date the information previously obtained. The Commission's requirements as
to disclosing the terms of employment contracts, under the 1934 Act, are to be found in
Form 10 for Corporations (Application for Registration), Items 29 and 30, and Exhibit
"F"; Form 10-K for Corporations (Annual Report), Items 5 and 6; Form S-K for
Current Reports, Items 1 and 2, and 5. In the agreements at hand, most of the pro-
visions follow a normal pattern, though in view of the smallness of the sample the writer's
conclusions as to general practices have not been based solely on this group of contracts.
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It is worth noting that even though the negotiations leading up to the
final contract may be characterized by considerable firmness on both sides,
they are hardly likely to be carried on in a "pound of flesh" atmosphere.
The company's representative does not want to take unfair advantage
of one of the present or future executives; in fact, he may not be suffi-
ciently hard-boiled in his attitude, particularly where one of the present
managers is concerned. The executive, for his part, seldom insists on a
provision which would be obviously detrimental to the corporation. Both
sides recognize, without much being said about it, that the contract will
not be quite so hard-and-fast as it looks on paper. If conditions change
so that the compensation becomes inadequate, the executive will probably
be able to persuade the board of directors to amend the contract to pro-
vide for a higher rate. An executive who is held to his contract against
his will is not likely to be of much value to the business. If, on the
other hand, the company falls on hard times, a request by the board that
the executive accept less than the contracted amount will very often be
honored. The discussion which follows should, therefore, be read with
the realization that any hardships resulting from the operation of the
agreement will probably be corrected as they arise by amendatory con-
tracts.
18
Let us now examine, clause by clause, a typical profit-sharing contract.
The Hiring Clause.
"1. The Corporation agrees to and hereby does employ the Exec-
utive, and the Executive agrees to and hereby does enter the employ
of the Corporation, as manager [chief executive] of the Corporation
in charge of the operation of its business and affairs, subject to the
supervision and direction of its Board of Directors, for a period
beginning ......... , 1940, and ending ......................................., 19.
unless sooner terminated pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 7
below."
This clause presents primarily the question of the duration of the
term and the nature of the office to be occupied. Many attorneys feel that
it is not desirable to hire an executive to serve for a fixed number of
years as "president" or "vice-president," or to fill any other by-law office,
since as a technical matter the officers must in most jurisdictions be
elected yearly by the board of directors. 9 In fact, the most desirable
18. Note that six of the agreements, supra note 17, are amendatory contracts.
19. In the following contracts the executive is named to a definite post:
ALLIED, 1: "General Manager."
BLOOMINGDALE A, 1: "General Manager of the business."
COLUMBIA A, 11: "President and General Manager."
EASTERN, 1: "General Manager . . . and, so long as he shall
be elected to such office, as President of the Corporation."
EsQuIRE, 3: "President of the Company, and in the event
that at any time the Board of Directors of the Company shall fail
[Vol. 50: 35
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form of hiring clause from an employer's point of view is one which
simply "employs" the executive without describing his position, or one
which engages him "to perform such duties as the Board of Directors
shall from time to time assign to him."20 Ordinarily, however, the exec-
utive will insist that the dignity of his position be safeguarded as care-
fully as the circumstances will permit. This is sometimes accomplished
by using a general clause of the type just mentioned, accompanied by
a statement that the duties initially to be performed by the employee
shall be those of "general manager," "chief executive," "manager of
sales in the New England territory," or the like, with the further pro-
vision that any change in the duties or rank of the executive shall be
only to a post of equal or greater dignity and importance. The executive
also may wish to have it provided that any such change shall only be
made after obtaining his prior consent in writing, or that he shall not,
without his consent, be assigned to duties outside a given state or group
of states.
The powers of the executive are seldom affirmatively enumerated,
though special circumstances may occasionally make this desirable.2 ' If
the executive is named to a definite post, the title given may indicate his
powers and responsibilities. Further, the executive's duties are generally
stated in the clause which is about to be discussed, and from this state-
ment of duties there can no doubt be derived a grant of power.
The Performance Clause.
"2. The Executive agrees to devote all of his time and effort to
the performance of his duties as manager [chief executive] of the
Corporation, and to the performance of all of the duties of office of
to elect him as President of the Company, or shall remove him as
President, he shall be free, if he so elects, to cancel this Agree-
ment."
In the following contracts, the executive's position is described more generally:
FEDERATEDm, E 2: "a manager of the business."
FiLEN.' A, 1: "a manager of the business."
In BURLINGTON, 1, the corporation merely agrees to "employ" the executive. In
WOOLWORTH A and WoOLWORTH B, which are form contracts, there is apparently no
express covenant of employment by the corporation.
20. See clause quoted infra note 22.
21. ALLIED, i 1: "During the term of the employment hereunder, Puckett shall be
the General Manager of Allied and its subsidiary, Allied Purchasing Corporation, and
shall have the full control and management of the business and affairs of Allied and
Allied Purchasing Corporation subject to the powers by law vested in the Board of Di-
rectors, the Executive Committee, and the officers of Allied and Allied Purchasing Cor-
poration."
FAiRBANxs A: "[The Company employs the executive as General Manager] with
authority to manage and control all of its operations and to hire and discharge and fix
the compensation of all of its employees, excepting the officers thereof elected from time
to time by its Board of Directors."
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President of the Corporation or of any subsidiary or subsidiaries of
the Corporation, if elected, all under the supervision and direction
of their respective toards of Directors."
This clause is generally somewhat broader in scope than the hiring
paragraph, since it is a covenant by the executive rather than by the
employer. The executive often agrees to perform any tasks demanded
by the directors," and sometimes to perform certain specified duties."0
He almost always states that he will perform "faithfully and to the best
of his ability," 4 and will give "his entire time" to the business." This
last point is also dealt with in Paragraph 6 of the contract.2 "
The Primary Compensation Clause.
"3. For the services to be rendered by him hereunder, the Cor-
poration agrees to pay the Executive, so long as he shall be employed
hereunder,
(a) a fixed salary at the rate of $ .................. per annum, payable in
equal monthly instalments at the end of each month; and
(b) an additional sum (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
22. The following clause appears particularly desirable from the employer's point
of view:
BURLINGTON, f 3: "Love agrees to serve the Corporation, and
such of the Corporation's subsidiary companies as may be designated
by the Corporation, faithfully, and to the best of his ability, under
the direction of the Board of Directors of the Corporation and of
such subsidiary companies, devoting his entire time, energy and skill
during the regular business hours of such employment, and to be of
good personal behavior and perform from time to time such ser-
vices as said Board of Directors shall request, and to act as Di-
rector, President and any other officer of the Corporation and of
any of its subsidiary companies, without further compensation."
23. See clauses quoted supra note 21.
24. "Faithfully and to the best of his ability": BURLINGTON, 3; FILENE A, 2.
"Faithfully and efficiently": BLOOMINGDALE A, 2.
"Faithfully and diligently": WOOLWORTH A, 1; WOOLWORTH B, 1.
"Faithfully and conscientiously": FEDERArED, 2.
"Diligently and to the best of his ability": EASTERN, 2.
"To use his best endeavor, judgment and energy to promote, improve and advance
the business and interests of the Company": FAIRBANK S A.
25. "Substantially his entire time and attention": ALI.IED, 1.
"Entire time, energy and skill during the regular business hours of such employ-
ment": BURLINGTON, 3.
"Entire time, skill and attention": COLUMBIA A, 2.
"Entire time and energy": EASTERN, 2.
"Such time and attention to the business of the Employer as may be fairly and rea-
sonably necessary": FEDERATED, 2.
"Give his time and attention to the business without unreasonably absenting himself
except by consent of the party of the first part": WOOLWORTH A, i 1; WOOLWORTH B,
91.
26. See p. 59 infra.
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'the Executive's percentage compensation') equal to - per cent
of the adjusted consolidated net earnings of the Corporation and its
subsidiaries2 for each calendar year of his employment hereunder
beginning January 1, 1940,28 such sum to be computed and payable
as provided in paragraph 4 below; provided always that the total
percentage compensation payable to the executive under this contract
during or for any calendar year shall not exceed the sum of $ _"
The fixed salary provisions require no comment. As to the percentage
compensation,29 our first reference must be to the fact that the basic
figure used is "the adjusted consolidated net earnings of the Corporation
and its subsidiaries." This is used rather than "the adjusted net earn-
ings of the Corporation," for the reason that a company which pays
percentage compensation is likely to be a holding company, using con-
solidated financial statements in reporting to its stockholders. 0  It would,
perhaps, be misleading and unfair to report to the stockholders on the
consolidated basis and pay compensation on the parent company basis.
It is arguable, at least, that the parent company as a separate entity might
be able to show a profit at a time when its subsidiaries were losing money.
At any rate, companies which report to stockholders on the consolidated
27. Or, in the case of a company without subsidiaries, "the adjusted net earnings of
the Corporation."
28. If the executive's employment does not begin at the start of the corporation's
accounting period, it will be advisable to add a clause providing for ratable adjustment
of the percentage compensation. This might be either a ratable portion of the earnings
of the entire fiscal year, or a percentage of the earnings actually accruing during the
months when the executive is on the job. This question assumes considerable importance
if the executive is not hired until after the most profitable season oi the year has passed.
29. The word "bonus" is very much in disfavor. The usual expression is "additional
compensation" (CoLMMIA A, !3). BLOOMIxNor.n A, 3, speaks of "a sum based on the
net earnings of the Employer"; BTRLiNoGTo, r 4, of a "share of the profits"; Woci-
WORTH A, 4, and WOoLwORTH B, 4, speak of "compensation equal to ... per cent of
the net profits."
FAIMEANcs B, ' (e) provides: "Nothing contained in this agreement shall be con-
strued to give the party of the second part any interest in or to the surplus or net profits
of the Company, it being agreed that the annual profits thereof are being adopted herein
as a standard by which to measure the amount of the additional compensation payable
under this agreement."
That properly authorized percentage compensation is a true business expense rather
than a division of shareholder's profits, see 1 WmLVsoz, CoNTnAcrs (rev. ed. 1936)
§ 130 B and cases cited. Non-executive employees, such as salesmen, are frequently hired
on a profit-sharing basis. See cases collected in Gormox, EpLOX' MET -. i AGE:=
AGREEmENTS (1940) 153, 154, 157.
30. COLUmIA A, ¢4, speaks of "annual consolidated net profits"; Buralxwlro-,
5 (1), of "consolidated net profits of the Corporation and of its subsidiary companies";
ALLIED, T2, of "net profits"; BLOOMINGDALE A, 3 (A), of "net earnings"; Wc L o-Trn
A, 4, and WOOLWORTH B, 4, of "net pr6fits." If the employing corporation is a holding
company, the expressions "net profits" or "net earnings" are ambiguous, and should not
be used.
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basis seem uniformly to use that basis in computing participations for
executives.
Regardless of the position which we may take as to the suitability of
consolidated balance sheets and consolidated income statements as a basis
for declaring dividends or for other business purposes,31 there seems
to be no insuperable legal objection to the use of consolidated earnings
figures as a base for percentage compensation. We are, after all, merely
seeking a fair measuring rod of the success of the enterprise, and, in the
case of a holding company, a consolidated statement prepared in con-
formity with good accounting practice doubtless provides such a mea-
sure.
3 2
A further accounting question relates to the period during which the
earnings are to be measured. The usual period is, of course, one year;
corporations keep their accounts on a yearly basis, and the writer knows
of no instance in which bonus compensation has been computed other-
wise. However, it must be recognized that for many businesses the year
is not a natural cycle; some companies would be justified in keeping their
accounts on a two-year, three-year, or even five-year basis. Occasionally,
we find wide fluctuations between the earnings of one calendar year and
the next; the executive may receive a large bonus in the first year and
none in the second, whereas if the company had been on a two-year ac-
counting basis, he would have received a bonus of perhaps one-fourth
of the amount actually paid. Ideally, perhaps, corporations should en-
deavor to determine what accounting system would properly reflect the
conditions prevailing in their particular line of business, and then regu-
late their bonus payments accordingly.3 This need not disturb the usual
31. For a short treatment of the subject, see Berle and Fisher, The Law of Business
Accounting (1932) 32 COL. L. REV. 573, 597-599.
32. A question may arise as to whether companies which are less than wholly owned
should be included in the consolidation, though accepted accounting practice usually pro-
vides an adequate answer. COLUMBIA A, ' 5, states: ". . . there shall be included [in
consolidated net profits], in the case of subsidiaries of which Columbia shall own less
than the entire capital stock, only such part of their net profits as shall be applicable to
dividends on stock of such subsidiaries held by Columbia." The same contract provides, at
S 8: "The term 'subsidiaries', as used herein, shall include future, as well as present sub-
sidiaries, and shall mean any corporation more than fifty per cent. (50%) of whose stock
entitled to vote for the election of directors is at the time owned by Columbia and/or any
other subsidiary of Columbia."
One caveat is perhaps necessary. If the executive does not render services which
benefit the entire group of companies, there is no justification for compensating him on
the basis of consolidated earnings. In a chain-store organization, for example, the vice-
president in charge of the midwest territory might deserve a bonus based on the earnings
of the stores in his territory, but hardly one based on the consolidated earnings of the
whole enterprise.
33. A parallel suggestion is that payments to stockholders should be based on some
period other than one year. O'LEARY, supra note 11, at 38.
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yearly audit and yearly report to stockholders. If a two-year cycle were
decided upon, it would merely mean that the executive would receive a
bonus every two years, based on the total earnings for that period. It
is doubtful, however, whether any such plan would ever be widely adopted,
inasmuch as the executive's own standard of living is generally based
on yearly commitments for rent, taxes, and the like.3 A desirable step
in this direction can be readily accomplished, however, by providing for
a carry-over of losses; that is, it can be agreed that the net loss of one
year is to be carried over and offset against the profit of the following
year, allowing the executive a percentage of the net amount remaining.
If such a clause is used, it should probably be accompanied by a proviso
that in no event shall the executive be required to refund to the company
any compensation paid to him in a previous year.
It will be noted that the compensation clause includes a proviso which
places a definite limitation on the amount payable. Sometimes, of course,
the executive is given a fixed percentage of the company's net profits,
regardless of the extent of the company's future earnings. In the event
of unexpected success, the company may find itself paying to the executive
a much larger dollar amount than was contemplated at the time the con-
tract was signed.- In numerous instances, an executive in such a situa-
tion has consented to a reduction in the percentage rate. Even if no such
reduction is made, many stockholders - perhaps most - would not object
too strenuously to payment at the old rate, inasmuch as their own profits
are being increased beyond their expectations. However, there may be
stockholders who will raise objection, and it seems evident that the courts
will give them support, at least in an extreme case. Thus, in the A merican
Tobacco case,36 the court had before it a by-law passed in 1912, giving
the executives a total of ten percent of the net profits of the company
above $8,222,248.42. In 1921 this produced a bonus of less than $360,000
for the managing group; in 1929 the operation of the by-law produced
a bonus of $2,670,000 for the group, paid in addition to salaries and
other rewards. The United States Supreme Court, sustaining a minority
stockholder's complaint, held that "the payments under the by-law have
by reason of increase of profits become so large as to warrant investi-
gation in equity in the interest of the company." 3 T While the Court's
34. It might also be difficult to work out a two-year plan which would not increase
the executive's tax burden. Under some plans, the executive's bonus for a given year is
payable in instalments over as much as four years. See BALDRsToN, MANAGERIAL PRoFT
SHARIN Gi (1928) 83-84. This may aid in preventing management turnover but it hardly
meets the problem of fluctuations in the company's earnings.
35. On the tax aspect of this situation, see .M.RTEns, THE LAw OF FeneLu. I.NcoMn
TAXATION (Cum. Supp. 1939) § 23.81.
36. Rogers v. Hill, 289 U. S. 582 (1933).
37. Per Butler, J., 289 U. S. 582, 591 (1933). The amounts produced by the by-law
in the years prior to 1921 are not revealed in the opinions or the record on appeal, as the
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decision might possibly have been different had the facts presented a
recent contract, rather than an outmoded by-law, the teachings of the
case are fairly plain.
Apart from the attitude of the courts, it is well to consider the public
relations aspect of the matter. A large part of the public condemnation
of bonus contracts, and of the litigation which they have all too fre-
quently caused, has been based on the payment of fantastically large
amounts arising from unforeseen increases in corporate earnings. Simply
from the standpoint of keeping on good terms with stockholders and
the public, executives should agree in advance to some definite limitation
upon the total monetary amount payable to them. Limiting clauses of
this nature are being used with increasing frequency,"8 often taking one
of the following forms:
1. A ceiling may be imposed, by inserting a proviso such as that given
in the text, limiting the gross amount payable.
2. A decreasing scale of percentages may be fixed in the contract. For
example, the 1937 contract between William S. Paley and the Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. ("Columbia C"), provides:
"Additional Compensation. As additional compensation, Columbia
agrees to pay, and/or cause its subsidiaries to pay, to Paley five
percent (5%) of the amount of the annual consolidated net profits
of Columbia and its subsidiaries (hereinafter referred to as 'such net
profits') up to $1,000,000., plus four percent (4%) of the next
$1,000,000. of such net profits, plus three percent (3%) of the next
$1,000,000. of such net profits, plus two percent (2%o) of the sum by
which such net profits shall exceed $3,000,000."39
Clauses such as the one just quoted are frequently used.40 The drafts-
plaintiff made no complaint concerning them. Another instance of compensation in excess
of amounts originally contemplated is that of the American Woolen Co., discussed in
BAKER at 227, 228, where stockholders' dissatisfaction led to the termination of the plan.
Compare the language of Dibell, J., in Seitz v. Union Brass & Metal Mfg. Co., 152 Minn.
460, 468-469, 189 N. W. 586, 589 (1922). See also KErnEv, op. Cit. supra note 14, at
117-118.
38. See BAKER, 208. A resolution proposed by a stockholder of the American Tobacco
Co., designed to place a definite limitation on the amounts received by the company's
executives, was defeated at a stockholders' meeting held on April 3, 1940. See N. Y.
Times, April 4, 1940, p. 33, col. 1.
39. This represents an amendment of COLUMBIA A, 4, which provided for a bonus
of 2Y2% of the consolidated net profits up to $600,000, and 5% of such profits above
$600,000.
40. See, for example, the plan of the Corn Products Refining Co. as summarized in
BAER, 212. The opposite arrangement-an increasing scale-is, of course, also possible.
BLOOMINGDALE B, 3, provides for a bonus of 1% on net profits (above preferred dividend
requirements), 1 % additional on that part of such profits which is in excess of $500,000,
and 21/2% additional on the part in excess of $1,000,000. See also the plan of the Con-
tinental Oil Co. as summarized in BAKcER, 212.
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man may work out other means of limiting the amount receivable in an
attempt to meet the needs of a particular business.4"
A similar problem is raised by the stockholder's desire to obtain divi-
dends, and the probability that he will be somewhat annoyed if the
company, failing to pay a dividend, nevertheless pays substantial bonus
compensation to its executives. Accordingly, many corporations include
in their employment contracts clauses to the effect that no bonus com-
pensation shall be payable for any year in which the stockholders have
not received a dividend.42 This is open to some objection. If the direc-
tors are unfriendly to the executives, they will simply fail to declare any
dividend. If, on the other hand, they are over-friendly to the executives,
they will declare dividends in some small amount for the sole purpose
of justifying bonus payments. A clause which at least partly meets
these objections is the following:
"No percentage compensation shall be payable to the Executive
for or during any year in which dividends are not declared and paid
in respect of shares of the common stock of the Corporation in an
amount equal to or in excess of $_ per share."
41. FAANKS B, (a) and (b), presents an interesting plan:
"(a) Upon the accounts of the Company covering its operations
for each calendar year of the term hereof having been approved by
its Board of Directors and audited and certified by a Certified Pub-
lic Accountant there shall be deducted from the net profits for such
year shown thereby a sum equalling six percent (6%) of the sum of
its average outstanding Common Capital Stock during such year and
its surplus and undivided profits at the beginning of such year as
shown by its books of account, which deductions are hereinafter
referred to as 'Capital Earnings.' The remainder after the deduc-
tion of such 'Capital Earnings' from the said net profits is herein-
after referred to as the 'Balance of Profits.'
"(b) Such additional compensation shall be that proportion of
the annual salary paid to said party of the second part during such
year as said 'Balance of Profits' shall bear to said 'Capital Earn-
ings' above described, provided, however, such additional compensa-
tion in any year shall not exceed the amount of one hundred per-
cent (100%) of said salary paid to said party of the second part
for such year."
WooLvORTH A and B grant a percentage of net profits derived from the sale of mer-
chandise; WOOLWORTH A, V U4 and 5, bases this on sales in stores owned or controlled
by the Corporation; WOOLWORTn B, 4 and 5, bases this on sales in stores owned or
controlled by the Corporation in the territory controlled by the district office managed by
the executive.
42. None of the contracts here studied contains a clause of this precise nature. The
Container Corp. bonus fund plan, supra note 5, provides: ". . . no such additiunal coin-
pensation shall be paid and no liability for such additional compensatiun shall be created
or recorded as to any fiscal year in which no dividend has been paid on the capital stozlz
of the Company." See also discussion of the Bethlehem and Westinghouse plans in
BAxER, 210, 211, 214, and note 46 infra.
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As a matter of recent history, however, it must be reported that cor-
porations which have omitted a dividend simply have not paid executive
bonuses for that year.4" In some instances, this may be due to a generous
renunciation on the part of the executive; in others, it may be caused by
a feeling that if he does not voluntarily waive his bonus, his position in
the corporation will be in jeopardy. It seems desirable, however, to put
the matter beyond doubt by an express clause in the contract.4
This development can be carried one step further, by basing the exec-
utive's bonus not on earnings but on the amount disbursed to stockholders
in the form of dividends. A plan of this nature was adopted several years
ago by the Bethlehem Steel Corporation, after previous bonus plans had
been subjected to attack in the courts.4a
Plans of the type just mentioned, as well as plans which forbid bonuses
in years in which dividends are not paid, are open to the possible objec-
tion that the directors may be tempted to favor the executives by declaring
a dividend under circumstances in which the financial condition of the
corporation really does not justify it. Although opinions may differ as
to whether or not this is a serious risk, but little protection against it
can be obtained, in any event, through contractual provisions. The stock-
holders must rely for their protection on the good faith and informed
judgment of the directors; if the directors are dishonest or negligent,
relief will have to come (if at all) through an action for violation of
fiduciary duty.
Still another approach to the same problem is to give the executive
a percentage of net earnings in excess of a stated amount (as in the
Tobacco case), or in excess of a stated return on invested capital, or
remaining after the payment of a dividend of specified amount.40  Such
43. See BAKER, 208.
44. At a stockholders' meeting of the Curtiss-Wright Corp., held on July 2, 1940, a
resolution was defeated which proposed that no incentive compensation be paid officers
and directors in any year in which a dividend of at least 10 cents a share was not declared
on common stock. N. Y. Times, July 3, 1940, p. 31, col. 3. At a stockholders' meeting of
the Pan American Airways Corp. on May 16, 1940, a resolution was defeated which
proposed that no bonus compensation be paid to officers and employees "unless a dividend
of at least like amount is distributed pro-rata among the stockholders." The manage-
ment resisted this proposal as an unwise restriction on the judgment of the directors.
See proxy statement, dated April 26, 1940.
45. See excerpts from the Bethlehem Steel Corp.'s plan given in BAKER, 210, 211.
For a digest of the Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co.'s bonus plan see BAKER, 214.
46. ALLIED, 2, and BLOOMINGDALE B, 1 3, provide that the executive shall receive
a percentage of the net profits remaining after provision for the annual preferred stock
dividend requirements, but no mention is made of common stock. See also FAIRBANKS B,
supra note 41; BALDERSTON, op. cit. supra note 34, at 71-75; Preinrich, Profil-Sharintg
Problems and Their Solution (1929) 48 J. AccouNTANcy 341, 350-353 (discussing basis
of fixing fair return on stockholders' investment).
Baker, studying the bonus plans of 30 large industrial companies (pp. 200-201),
found that 15 made a deduction in favor of stockholders in calculating the bonus fund, I
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a plan has much to recommend it, as it avoids many of the difficulties
which have just been discussed, and is, in effect, a method of informing
the management that the stockholders must be given a fair return on
their investment before the executive receives a share in the profits.
The Computation Clause.
"4. The adjusted consolidated net earnings of the Corporation and
its subsidiaries, for the purpose of computing the Executive's per-
centage compensation under the provisions of paragraph 3 above,
shall be determined in accordance with accepted accounting practice
by the independent accounting firm employed by the Corporation as
its auditors, within 90 days after the end of each calendar [fiscal]
year. The computation by such firm of the net earnings and of the
Executive's percentage compensation, made in the manner herein
provided, shall be final and binding upon the Corporation and upon
the Executive, and the Corporation shall pay such compensation to
the Executive within 120 days after the end of the calendar [fiscal]
year in question. For the purpose of computing the Executive's
percentage compensation, the adjusted consolidated net earnings of
the Corporation and its subsidiaries for any of the periods referred
to in paragraph 3 above shall be determined before deducting
(a) profit participations, if any, which may be payable by the cor-
poration under any plan, agreement or contract with its other
officers, or any of them;
but shall be after full allowance for, and deduction of,
(a) all expenses and other charges applicable to the operations for
such period, including all expenditures by the Corporation for
engineering or development work, or any similar expenditures,
except to the extent that, in the discretion of the Board of
Directors, such expenditures may be properly capitalized;
(b) all federal, state and municipal taxes;
(c) depreciation for such period based on the amount of deprecia-
tion set forth in the annual report of the Corporation to its
stockholders for the calendar year which includes such period,
and approved by said independent accounting firm, whether the
made such a deduction for preferred stock only, 13 made no deduction, 1 gave no informa-
tion. The plan formerly in use by The National City Bank was thus described by the
court in Gallin v. Nat City Bank, 152 Misc. 679, 699, 273 N. Y. Supp. 87, 109 (Sup. Ct.
1934), cited supra note 5: "After eight per cent had been set aside for the stockhiolders on
invested and employed capital, one-fifth of the total remaining net profits in any one year
was apportioned by periodical action of the boards among the executives responsible for
the management, and the remaining four-fifths distributed to the stockholders."
The Container Corp. plan (supra notes 5 and 42) provides that from net profits there
shall be first deducted "an amount equivalent to 6cA of the aggregate of the Capital Stuck
and Surplus accounts as at the beginning of the year for which the additional compensa-
tion is to be calculated"; the bonus fund is to be 15% of the balance renaining after such
deduction.
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depreciation so reported shall be more or less than the deprecia-
tion allowed by the federal income tax authorities for the pur-
pose of computing federal income taxes for such year;
(d) such write-offs and reserves as the auditors may recommend
and/or the Board of Directors deem advisable, so that the
directors shall be permitted and enabled to exercise the fullest
degree of conservative, prudent business judgment in making
write-offs and in setting up reserves against contingencies and
for all other purposes;
(e) all items of capital and non-recurring gains and profits, not
arising from the ordinary operation of the business of the Cor-
poration; except that if the Board of Directors in its uncon-
trolled discretion finds that the Executive has been instrumental
in producing for the Corporation any such item of capital or
non-recurring gains and profits, the Board shall have power
expressly to direct that any such item of non-recurring gains
and profits shall be included in whole or in part in determining
adjusted consolidated net earnings of the Corporation and its
subsidiaries for the purpose of computing the Executive's per-
centage compensation."
In the computation clause, our effort is to define and limit the earn-
ings fund so as to confine it to sources of income which the executive
has aided in producing, and at the same time to attain reasonable ease
of administration and calculation. We start, then, with the accountants'
determination of "net earnings"- imperfect though that determination
may be 47 - and next state expressly various deductions from incone.4
Operating expenses, of course, must be deducted, and it is possible to
47. See p. 55 infra.
48. See ALLIED, 14; BLOOMINGDALE A, ' 3D; BURLINGTON, 5(2); FAIRIDANKS B;
WOOLWORTH A and B, 1 5. COLUMBIA A, 5 provides: "Dcternination of Nei Profits.
Columbia agrees to cause its accounts and books and those of its subsidiaries to be audit-
ed, and their consolidated net profits to be determined, at the end of each fiscal year, by
Messrs. Price, Waterhouse & Co. or such other reputable firm of certified public accountants
as shall be selected by the Board of Directors of Columbia. Such net profits shall be dc-
termined according to standard accounting methods, and in such determination all federal,
state, and municipal taxes other than income and excess profits taxes, and a reasonable
amount for depreciation and all other appropriate reserves, shall be deducted; and there
shall be included, in the case of subsidiaries of which Columbia shall own less than the
entire capital stock, only such part of their net profits as shall be applicable to dividends
on stock of such subsidiaries held by Columbia. The certified audits of such accontanlts,
including their determination of such consolidated net profits, shall be conclusive and bind-
ing upon the parties hereto." The second sentence (beginning "Such net profits") was
later amended by COLUMBIA B to read as follows: "Such net profits shall be determined
according to standard accounting methods, and in such determination all federal, state
and municipal taxes including income and excess profits taxes, and a reasonable amount
for depreciation and all other appropriate reserves, shall be deducted."
[Vol. 50: 35
PROFIT-SHARING CONTRACT
go into considerable detail in specifying them." Frequently, federal and
state income taxes will expressly be made deductible, and the executive
will be given a percentage of the net earnings remaining after provision
for their payment.50 Inasmuch as the federal income tax and similar
taxes can be computed only after the executive's total compensation (pro-
vided it is reasonable) is deducted as a corporate expense, it is evident
that the accountants will have to employ a little algebra. A similar prob-
lem, but one of much more difficulty, arises when the corporation employs
more than one executive on a percentage compensation basis. The ques-
tion here is whether the compensation of any one executive should be
computed as a percentage of the net earnings remaining after the com-
pensation payable to the other executives has been deducted as an expense.
If the contract with any single executive fails to provide that the per-
centage compensation payable to the other executives shall not be
deducted as an expense, it is doubtless necessary that this deduction be
made, despite difficulties in making the computation. Usage varies as to
deducting all or any part of the executive's own compensation." It
would seem that only his fixed salary should be deducted.
49. Operating Expenses: "all ordinary and necessary expenses," BURUNGTON, 55(2);
"all legitimate expense," WOOLWORTH A, 5, WooLVoRTH B, 5.
Particular items of expense are often specified: "reserve for contingencies," FRn-
BANKS B, (c); "interest," ALLiED, '2; BLtr LIuGrox, 5(2); "losses," BUMLINGTO..,
5(2); "obsolescence," BTRUKGTOx, 5(2); "cost of all ordinary alterations and re-
pairs," "WOOLWORTH A, T5; WooLwoRTH B, '.5; "depreciation," BuPUhNGTo::, T 5(2);
COLmBmi A, 5; FA.RBANxS B, (c) ; "depreciation on fixtures at the rate of 5% per
annum," WOOLWORTH A, 5; WOOLWORTH B, ' 5; "bad debts," BumnIGTo, 55(2);
FAmANKs B, (c); "unearned factory profit on branch house goods," FAxns B,
(c).
Depredation, repairs, loss of finished product, and insurance are all proper deduc-
tions under an agreement to share the "net profits" of an enterprise. Stone v. Wright
Wire Co., 199 Mass. 306, 85 N. E. 471 (1903) ; see Stein v. Strathmore Worsted Mills,
221 Mass. 86, 89, 103 N. E. 1029, 1030 (1915).
50. Ax.un., 4, BUmINiGToN, ' 5(2), and FAmRBANxS B, I (c) provide that all taxes
shall be deducted as an expense. As to the COLUM'BL contract, see note 48 supra. For
illustrative computations of typical income tax and accounting problems arising from
profit-sharing contracts, see Preinrich, supra note 46, at 346-349.
WooLwoRTH A, 5, deducts "Governmental Income Taxes and other taxes"; WooL-
WORTH B, 5, deducts "Federal Income Taxes and other taxes."
Where a bonus was given under a directors' resolution which spoke of "net earnings
a . . fter . . . all expenses . . . [and] depreciation," it wvas held that state and federal
taxes must be deducted before computing the employee's percentage compensation.
Fleischer v. Pelton Steel Co., 183 Wis. 451, 193 N. V. 444 (1924). See also Ransome
Concrete Mach. Co. v. Moody, 282 Fed. 29, 35, 36 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922).
51. ALLmD, 4, provides that all compensation payable to the executive himself under
the contract shall be deducted as an expense. WooLWoRTH A, 5, provides for the deduc-
tion of "store managers' compensation."
BLOOMINGDALE A, T 3 D, provides: "... there shall not be deducted in determining
'net earnings' or 'basic net earnings' for the purpose of this agreement the amount pay-
able under said clause 3 B to the employee hereunder or the amount payable to Harry
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A more serious question is whether or not the executive shall be per-
mitted to share in capital and non-recurring gains. It will be noted that
the form given in the text contains a clause attempting to prevent him
from sharing in such gains. This device has not been tested by the writer's
experience, as the contracts on which the form was based did not contain
such a clause. However, it has been included here because it represents
a recent and apparently sound trend. The Burlington contract expresses
the underlying idea more simply, and probably as effectively, by providing
that the executive is to share in income "from ordinary operations (ex-
clusive of capital and non-recurring gains and losses)."" Likewise, the
plan adopted by the Continental Oil Co. in January, 1937, provides that
"Net nonrecurring gains and profits will not be included in the compu-
tation of earnings except to the extent authorized by the Board of Direc-
tors."" Similarly, the Merit Bonus Plan of the DuPont Co. is based
on "surplus net receipts . . . on the capital employed by the company
and its substantially wholly owned subsidiaries, which capital is primarily
of an operative as distinguished from an investment character." Other
portions of the DuPont plan indicate that it is not intended to distribute
under the plan earnings derived from investments, such as the company's
investment in the stock of General Motors Corporation."4 These are
good precedents, but they are probably not followed as frequently as
they should be. The average bonus contract no doubt still provides that
the executive is to share in "net earnings."
Quite apart from any express clause on the subject, however, a strong
argument can be made for interpreting the ordinary reference to "net
earnings" in bonus contracts as applying only to operating earnings. The
purpose of the contract is to give the executive a share in earnings pro-
duced by his own efforts, and it may well be urged that any intention
to give him a share in capital gains or other income not derived from
the normal operation of the business must be stated in the most explicit
terms. Suppose, for example, that the corporation receives an attractive
offer for the purchase of its interest in an important subsidiary. If the
A. Hatry under a similar clause designated as 3 B in an agreement of even date between
this corporation and said Harry A. Hatry."
BURLINGTON, ff 5 (2), provides: ". . . there shall be deducted . . . salaries, includ-
ing the amount of the salary paid to Love pursuant to Article 'FOURTH' hereof (and
including, but without limitation, salaries and/or other compensation payable to officers,
directors, and any other employees, but excluding all additional compensation payments,
based upon a percentage of the profits, payable to officers and employees in accordance
with the policies heretofore pursued by the Corporation and its predecessor corpora-
tions)."
52. BURLINGTON A, 5(2).
53. Excerpt from report of the Continental Oil Co. to the SEC, Form 10K, Item 5, as
quoted in BAxe, 212.
54. See BARe, 213.
[Vol. 50: 35
PROFIT-SHARIVG CONTRACT
executive knows that he is to share in whatever capital gain is realized
by the corporation upon the sale, he will be strongly tempted to approve
the proposition, even though the corporation would then be faced with
the problem of finding an equally advantageous investment for its funds.
As the corporation is not in the business of buying and selling its invest-
ments in subsidiaries, there appears no reason for allowing the executive
to share in any profit so derived.""
On the other hand, if the executive is to be deprived of any share in
non-recurring profits, he will argue that he should not have to take the
burden of non-recurring losses. There is some merit in this contention,
and provisions are occasionally inserted in contracts that the executive
-will neither benefit from non-recurring profits nor share the burden of
non-recurring losses.5 It is evident, however, that if the corporation sells
an asset - for example, its investment in a subsidiary - at a very con-
siderable loss, the stockholders will be disgruntled if the executive receives
a substantial bonus for the very year in which the loss was incurred.
From a practical standpoint, therefore, it may not be good judgment
for the executive to seek to have his bonus computed on a basis more
favorable than the income reported to the stockholders. Yet such special
methods of computation are frequently provided for. The parties often
agree, for example, that losses due to events occurring before the exec-
utive became connected with the company, but actually charged off on
the books after his employment began, should not be deducted from
income in determining his bonus.57 Little is to be found in the cases
55. No direct authority on the point has been found. It would seem, however, that
bonus contracts should be strictly construed in favor of the corporation. But see Flan-
nery Bolt Co. v. Flannery, 16 F. Supp. 803 (W. D. Pa. 1935), rcz,'d, 86 F. (2d) 43 (C.
C. A. 3d, 1936).
56. See BURLINGTON A, 5(2). If it is desired to insert such a provision in the
principal form, the following language may be used (to follow the first clause "(a)" in
Paragraph 4):
"(b) losses of a non-recurring nature, not connected with the ordi-
nary operation of the business of the Corporation; except that
the Board of Directors shall have power expressly to direct that
any such loss or losses shall be deducted in whole or in part in
determining adjusted consolidated net earnings of the Corpora-
tion and its subsidiaries for the purpose of computing the
Executive's percentage compensation."
57. A clause of this nature, which may be inserted in the principal form (to follow
the first clause "(a)" in Paragraph 4), is the following:
"(b) losses actually incurred prior to . . ., 1940, or reserves,
charged against profits, actually relating to the period prior
to . . ., 1940, although such losses or reserves may be real-
ized, or approved and recorded on the books of the Corpora-
tion, subsequent to said date; provided, however, that if, after
charging any such losses or reserves, there should be any re-
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bearing upon the validity of such an arrangement. 8  An extreme case
is conceivable, in which a company reports a loss to its stockholders, but,
nevertheless, pays a bonus based on a special formula which shows earn-
ings available for executive compensation. It seems that stockholders
in such an event are not entitled to complain. The distribution to the
executive is not in the nature of a dividend, but rather in the nature of
the discharge of a debt- assuming always that the bonus contract was
properly adopted and was "reasonable" in its terms. The mere use of a
special formula should not render it unreasonable. As we have noticed,
sales managers very often receive bonus compensation based on a per-
centage of sales ;" it is arguable that if sales increase, the sales manager
is entitled to increased compensation even though the earnings of the
corporation as a whole were materially reduced by poor management in
other departments.6" It seems, however, that the use of gross receipts
as a compensation base should not be permitted in the case of a general
executive, who might be able to cause an increase in gross receipts by
means which would reduce net profits. Can creditors complain of these
special formulae for determining earnings? Probably not, if no actual
injury to them has been shown - and it would be a rare case in which
injury could be proven.
The date of payment of the bonus is ordinarily in the spring, after
the completion of the annual audit."' The computation of the bonus
covery by the Corporation of any portion of the amount so
charged, the amount so recovered shall not be included in
adjusted consolidated net earnings of the Corporation and its
subsidiaries for the purpose of computing the Executive's
percentage compensation."
58. Where a salesman's contract provided that he was to receive a percentage of the
"net profits" of the business for a given year, and there was no express provision that the
company's normal accounting methods should be followed, it was held that losses due to
bad debts previously on the books and not charged off until the year in question should not
be considered in computing the salesman's compensation. See Stein v. Strathmore Wor-
sted Mills, 221 Mass. 86, 92, 108 N. E. 1029, 1031 (1915); di. Hubbard v. New York,
N. E. & W. Investment Co., 14 Fed. 675 (C. C. D. Mass. 1882).
59. See note 4 supra.
60. In Bettendorf v. Bettendorf, 190 Iowa 83, 179 N. W. 444 (1920), the court was
called upon to construe a contract giving the executive a percentage of the net earnings
of the Bettendorf Axle Company "which may have accrued exclusively from the railway
department [of the Axle Company]." This provision was enforced literally, the court
stating that the intention was to "eliminate deductions owing to loss in other depart-
ments."
61. Otherwise, of course, where the corporation has a fiscal year other than the cal-
endar year.
Dates for payment are set as follows: BLOOMINGDALE A, 3 A: "as soon as may be
after the determination of said basic net earnings [after the close of each fiscal year]";
BURLiNGTON, 5 (4) : "within thirty days after the completion of the annual audit of the
Corporation by its accountants"; WOOLWoRTu A, fI 4, and WooLwoRTn B, 5 4: "an-
nually as soon as may be convenient after January first but not later than March first."
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normally takes place at the close of the audit, and should be made by the
corporation's regular public accountants. - It is customarily provided
that the accountants shall follow accepted accounting practice in making
the computation," and that their determinations shall bind both the cor-
poration and the executive.
4
"Accepted accounting practice," however, is not quite the positive
solution of all difficulties that lawyers would like to consider it. Account-
ants can differ in their views as frequently as lawyers can; their craft is
subject to almost as many variables and guesses as the law. Earnings,
after all, are not something fixed and concrete - they are not to be
computed by subtracting disbursements from cash receipts. Rather, they
represent an informed estimate of income, guided by accounting con-
ventions which, although they may be valid in a majority of cases, may
not bear a very direct relation to the realities of a particular business."
When our contract provides, therefore, that the computation of earnings
shall be made according to accepted accounting practice, and that the
decision of the company's auditors shall be final, we must realize that
we have in fact entered into something very similar to an arbitration
agreement, and that the honesty and good judgment of the arbitrators
will be of great importance.
Equally important, however, is the role of the directors. Subject to
what has been said above regarding special earnings formulae, it is ordi-
narily wise to have the contract recognize expressly the power of the
directors to reduce the amount of the corporation's net earnings by setting
up whatever reserves for losses and contingencies they, in the exercise
of good business judgmenf, deem necessary. One of the principal criti-
cisms of percentage contracts is that the executive will be tempted to
exercise his influence in the direction of keeping the corporation from
adopting a conservative policy in respect to such matters as depreciation,
writing off assets of doubtful value, making provision for contingencies,
and the like. An independent and conscientious firm of accountants can,
of course,'be of great service in this connection. However, an accountant
may be put in a very embarrassing position if the corporation president,
62. BURLiNGTON, 15(2); CoLUinm A, 5; FAMAwKs B, I (a).
63. AL.aD, 4 ("good accounting practice") ; BLOOMINGDALE A, T3 D ("usual prac-
tice of the employer and accepted accounting methods") ; Bum=NGo, 5 5(2); CoLm.-t-
BIA A, 5.
64. ALLiD, 4; COLUMBIA A, 5.
65. See 1 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF" PROPERTY (1937) 253. An honest failure to
take sufficient depreciation may inflate purported earnings just as misleadingly as fraudu-
lent misstatement. Compare BAKER, 228. The courts, on the other hand, sometimes seem
a little too certain as to just what "net profits" are. See Orlando Orange Groves Co. v.
Hale, 107 Fla. 304, 313, 144 So. 674, 677 (1932), s. c., 119 Fla. 159, 161 So. 284 (1935) ;
Stein v. Strathmore Worsted Mills, 221 Mass. 86, 88, 108 N. E. 1029, 1030 (1915) ; In re
The Spanish Prospecting Co., Ltd., [1911] 1 Ch. 92, 98-101.
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holding a percentage contract, informs him that a questioned asset such
as an account receivable should be carried on the books without write-
down in view of its possible recovery in value, even though the account-
ant believes that the facts would justify a substantial write-down. The
accountant knows that there can be a reasonable difference of opinion
on such matters, and that he is hardly justified in viewing the executive's
stand as based entirely on personal motives. To relieve the accountant
of the entire burden of responsibility in such a situation, it may be ad-
visable for the board of directors to assign a committee of its members
to supervise the completion of the annual audit"0 and the computation
of the executive's percentage compensation.
An additional reason for close supervision by the directors of the com-
putation of percentage payments lies in the fact that they may be held
personally liable for any over-payments. Stockholders' suits have in
several instances been brought against directors on the allegation that
compensation payable under a bonus contract was computed by the bonus-
receiving executives themselves, that the computation was incorrect, and
that the directors are liable for their negligence in not having seen to
it that the compensation was properly computed and confined to the
correct amount.6 7 The directors should therefore see to it that the com-
putation is made by disinterested persons and carefully checked by disin-
terested representatives of the board.6" If an important difference of
opinion arises, it may be advisable to take the matter before the entire
board- perhaps even to draft and adopt an amended contract."0
66. As to a somewhat similar committee set up by,the DuPont Co., see Annual Re-
port (1939) E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., p. 21.
67. As to a suit of this nature recently brought against certain officers and directors
of the F. W. Woolworth Co., see N. Y. Times, July 10, 1940, p. 27, col. 4.
68. In Gallin v. Nat. City Bank, 152 Misc. 679, 273 N. Y. Supp. 87 (Sup. Ct. 1934),
cited supra note 5, the plaintiff stockholders alleged that not only was the compensation
paid excessive but that it had been wrongly computed. The court referred both these issues
to a referee, whose report is to be found in 155 Misc. 880, 281 N. Y. Supp. 795 (1935).
The referce said in part: "It was incumbent upon the directors to see to it that the for-
mula was followed with strict impartiality and they could not delegate this dity to those
who would participate in the fund or to others who acted under the supervision and guid-
ance of the latter. The board of directors and executive committee of the company, to
insure the proper computation of the management fund, should have intrusted that work
to officers or employees in no manner interested in the management fund. Failure so to do
constituted a breach of their duty as directors and subjects them to liability for the res-
toration of moneys improperly paid through such erroneous computations of the man-
agement fund." 155 Misc. 880, 893, 281 N. Y. Supp. 795, 808 (1935).
69. In Gallin v. Nat. City Bank, cited supra notes 5 and 68, the referee discussed cer-
tain losses suffered by the corporation which were not deducted from net profits in the
computation of additional compensation (155 Misc. 880, 893-903, 281 N. Y. Supp. 795,
808-818 (1935)), and held the directors liable for their failure to deduct. The referee
stated: "The record shows clearly that whenever the executive committee and board of
directors of the bank desired to modify the formula so as to eliminate a loss, whether
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Not only do bonus contracts offer a great temptation to the executives
to set up systems of accounting which will show an unduly high margin
of profit, and methods of computation which will enlarge the bonus, but
they may lead to the adoption of corporate policies which will increase
present profits at the expense of the company's future. Under certain
contracts according to which executives are paid on the basis of profits,
without any limitation on total amounts payable or any provision for
the prior payment of dividends, a premium is put on increasing the gross
profits of the company by any possible means, such as merger or con-
solidation with other companies, regardless of the fact that the net return
per share on the increased corporate capital will in all probability be
subject to the law of diminishing returns, to the detriment of the in-
dividual stockholders." This difficulty is not easily solved. It would be
foolish to forbid the expansion of the company simply to guard against
such occurrences. It might, of course, be possible to have the contract
provide that bonus compensation should not be payable unless and until
dividends were paid upon a basis which would maintain the original
earning power of each share of the company's capitalization. Even assum-
ing that such a provision would be workable, there would still be no
means of assuring the stockholders that each share would have the same
degree of earning power that it would if the company had been left in
its original uncombined condition. Here, again, it is the honesty and
diligence of the board of directors upon which reliance must ultimately
be placed.
The Merger Clause.
"5. The Corporation will not consolidate or merge into or with
another corporation, or sell all or substantially all of its assets to
another corporation, unless such other corporation (hereinafter re-
charged to surplus or as a current operating loss, they effected such modification of the
formula by an express resolution or action duly adopted at a regular or special meeting
of the executive committee or the board." 155 Misc. S60, 895, 281 N. Y. Supp. 795, 810
(1935). The referee seems to have proceeded on the basis that any such modification of
the formula by express action of the executive committee or the board of directors would
justify a corresponding change in the computation. All of the adjustments made by the
referee (with imposition of liability) seem to be on account of items which were not made
the subject of express resolution-usually losses not properly charged against earnings
available for compensation. Quacre, however, whether this may be taken to mean that any
modification of a computation formula made by the executive committee or the board of
directors in favor of an executive, so that his compensation can be figured on a more ad-
vantageous basis, is to be regarded as valid and proper. An amendatory contract, adopted
with all the formality of the original agreement, is often advisable, and perlaps even neces-
sary. See note 18 supra.
70. See Raynolds v. Diamond Mfills Paper Co., 69 N. J. Eq. 299, 315, 316, 60 Ati.
941, 948 (1905) ; Berendt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 108 N. J. Eq. 148, 149, 154 At. 321
(19--'1); cf. Summers, A Comparison of the Rates of Earning of Large-Scalc and Small-
', .l Industries (1932) 46 Q. J. Eco. 465, 479; Livermore, The Success of Indusirial
We:igers (1935) 50 Q. J. Ecox. 68.
19401
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
ferred to as the 'Successor Corporation') shall assume this agree-
ment; and upon such assumption the Executive and the Successor
Corporation shall become obligated to perform the terms and condi-
tions hereof; provided, however, that
(a) The Executive need not be named as chief executive of the
Successor Corporation, and his duties shall be such as shall be
prescribed by the Board of Directors of the Successor Corpora-
tion;
(b) The Executive's percentage compensation shall be based as
nearly as may be upon the earnings attributable to the assets
owned by the Corporation at the time of any such consolidation,
merger or sale, and shall be determined by the independent
accounting firm employed by the Successor Corporation as Its
auditors, the determination of such accounting firm to be final
and binding upon the Successor Corporation and upon the
Executive."
The problem dealt with in this clause is obviously a delicate one. The
executive hardly wishes to interfere with his corporation's proper ex-
pansion through combination with another enterprise. In fact, if he is
to be the head of the combined enterprises, he will usually welcome the
idea -perhaps for the reasons discussed above. On the other hand,
the use of the merger or consolidation device to demote or displace an
unwanted executive is one which might occur to a hostile board of direc-
tors - fruitless as the attempt might ultimately prove.71 While modern
statutes and case law generally provide some means for protecting credi-
tors of a merging corporation,'72 the position of a claimant under a con-
tract naming him as "chief executive" of the 'corporation is a particularly
difficult one.7" What is to be done if A Corporation has a contract with
B hiring him as "chief executive," X Corporation has a similar contract
with Y, and then A Corporation merges with X Corporation? If the
parties can agree, well and good. If not, trouble will result. Accordingly,
if combinations are probable, the executive will usually try to clarify the
situation in advance. Frequently, however, the executive does not succeed
in getting a clause as favorable to him as the one which is given above.
74
71. Compare Small v. Sullivan, 245 N. Y. 343, 157 N. E. 261 (1927). The writer, in
collaboration with Carl H. Fulda, is preparing an article on the use of the merger de-
vice, and other similar expedients, to evade corporate obligations.
72. See STEVENS, CORPORATIONS (1936) 754-758; Note (1921) 15 A. L. R. 1112, 1133;
N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW §§ 85, 90.
73. Compare Ducasse v. American Yellow Taxi Operators, Inc., 224 App. Div. 516,
231 N. Y. Supp. 51 (2d Dep't 1928) (claimant contracted to supply all taxi meters needed
in business of A Corp.; A Corp. later merged with B Corp.) ; Levy Leasing Co. Inc. v.
Bank of America Nat. Ass'n, 143 Misc. 365, 256 N. Y. Supp. 406 (Munic. Ct. 1932).
74. COLUMBIA A, U 9: "This agreement shall be binding upon and shall inure to the
benefit of any corporation which, by consolidation, merger or otherwise, shall succeed to
the business of Columbia and/or any of its subsidiaries."
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The Covenant Against Competition.
"6. The Executive agrees that during the period of his employ-
ment he will not make any other corporate affiliations without the
approval of the Board of Directors of the Corporation. The Exec-
utive further agrees that during the period of employment, and
during a further period of two years after leaving the employ of
the Corporation, whether upon the expiration of this contract or
otherwise, he will not directly or indirectly engage in the produc-
tion or the manufacture or the distribution of any products similar
to those manufactured or sold by the Corporation, either for his own
benefit, or for or with any person, firm or corporation whatsoever
other than the Corporation."
This clause supplements paragraph 2 (the performance clause)." The
restrictions imposed on the executive, which vary a good deal in strict-
ness,76 are of course to be interpreted in the light of the "rule of reason." '
The Illness and Incapacity Clause.
"7. Notwithstanding anything herein contained,
(a) In the event that the Executive shall, during the term of his
employment hereunder, fail to perform his duties hereunder
owing to illness or other incapacity and such illness or other
incapacity shall continue for a period of more than - months,
EsQUIRE, 7 7: "Anything herein to the contrary notwithstanding, in the event it is
determined by the Company to effect a merger or consolidation of the Company with any
other corporation or business or to dispose of the entire or substantially the entire busi-
ness of the Company to another corporation or business, and in that connection it becomes
advisable in the judgment of the Board of Directors to modify the terms of employment
above set forth, it is understood that the Board of Directors may so modify said terms of
employment and in the event Smart is not satisfied with such modification, he shall be
released from his obligations hereunder."
FDmRATED, '4: "During the continuance of this agreement of employment, the Em-
ployer will continue in active business and will not change its name or the nature of its
business; and it will not sell, lease or exchange all or substantially all of its assets, in-
cluding its good will, or do any other acts tending to prevent the full performance of this
agreement."
75. See pp. 41-42 supra.
76. COLUmIA A, 7 2: "Paley agrees to devote his entire time, skill and attention to
such business and during the term of such employment agrees not to engage in any other
business or occupation; but such prohibition shall not extend to the supervision by Paley
of his personal investments."
WooLwoRTHr A, 2: "Party of the second part also agrees that during the term of
this contract or during a term of five years after the expiration or cancellation of same, he
will not be interested, directly or indirectly, in any competing store or business within
a radius of ten miles of any store of party of the first part, or impart any trade secrets or
information that might be harmful to party of the first part, and that during the term
of this contract, he will not be interested in or transact any other business that vill inter-
fere with his duties under this contract without first having obtained the consent of the
party of the first part."
77. See 5 WIL.ISTOx, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) § 1643.
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the Corporation shall have the right, by notice 78 sent by regis-
tered mail addressed to him at . .... .................... P
to terminate the Executive's employment hereunder as of a
date (not less than 30 days after the date of the sending of
such notice) to be specified in such notice, and the Executive
shall be entitled to receive his fixed compensation and his per-
centage compensation as provided in paragraphs 3 and 4 hereof
to the last day of the calendar month in which such notice
shall be sent; provided, however, that if, prior to the date
specified in such notice, the Executive's illness or incapacity
shall have terminated and he shall have taken up and performed
his duties hereunder, the Executive shall be entitled to resume
his employment hereunder as though said notice had not been
given.
(b) In the event of the Executive's death during the term of his
employment hereunder, the Executive's legal representatives
shall be entitled to receive his fixed compensation and his per-
centage compensation as provided in paragraphs 3 and 4 hereof
to the last day of the calendar month in which the Executive's
death shall have occurred."
Many employment contracts do not contain provisions as to the ter-
mination of the contract prior to the expiration of the fixed term or as
to steps to be taken in the event of illness or incapacity. Negotiation on
these subjects is likely to be difficult, and both sides will often prefer
to leave the matter unmentioned in the contract, to be decided as best
it may when and if difficulty later arises. Doubtless, however, a reason-
able effort should be made to reach a prior agreement on the subject;
perhaps certain contingencies can be met by insurance coverage. Pro-
visions terminating the contract in the event of the executive's death,
resignation, or permanent disability, and giving a pro rata share of the
bonus in such event, are, however, fairly frequent. 79
78. A provision as to notice may well be inserted in a separate clause later in the
contract. See note 88 infra.
79. See BLOOMINGDALE A, 4; BURLINGTON, 5(3); WOOLWVORTH A, 7; WOOL-
woRTHr B, 7. ALLIED, 7, makes no provision as to resignation.
BURLINGTON, 5(3), reads as follows: "If, while in the employ of the Corporation
or of any of its subsidiary companies, Love should die before the last day of any calen-
dar or fiscal year, or if this contract should be terminated by the Corporation for cause
before the last day of any calendar or fiscal year, said additional compensation shall be
computed as follows: The total amount of additional compensation for the calendar or
fiscal year which would have been payable to Love in the event that he had lived or con-
tinued in the employ of the Corporation during such calendar or fiscal year shall first be
computed. This sum shall be divided into as many equal parts as there are months in
such fiscal period, and Love, or his personal representative, shall receive one of such parts
for each month from the first day of said fiscal period to the last day of the third calendar
month following the date of his death, or termination of employment as aforesaid. In no
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Again, many contracts contain no provisions relating to the dismissal
of the executive by the directors.80 In this connection, it should be noted
that statutory provisions to the effect that the directors may remove any
"officer, agent or employee . . . at pleasure" do not necessarily mean
that the dismissal of an officer prior to the expiration of his contract
term will be without risk to the corporation. In such a case, the dismissed
officer may have an action for damages against the company."'
Inflation Clauses. Provisions protecting the executive against the con-
sequences of currency inflation deserve special mention, though they are
not in wide use. Of course, a participation contract's very nature pro-
vides a certain amount of such protection, at least in the case of businesses
which are expected to be benefitted by inflation. On the other hand, in
the many lines of business which are expected to suffer seriously if
inflation occurs, a percentage contract does not protect the executive.
In such a case, the enterprise might suffer so severely from the conse-
quences of inflation that it would be unconscionable or even fruitless
for the executive to try to exact a higher salary. Occasionally, however.
one finds cases in which it is not clear what the effect of inflation would
be upon the particular business, and the executive not only wvishes to
obtain a percentage of the profits but wants to be sure that in the event
of inflation his fixed salary will be increased. The old-fashioned gold
clause being no longer available, attention has been turned to various
means of establishing a measure of inflation and causing the amount
of compensation to be varied accordingly. While this is not the place to
attempt to discuss the vast problem of efforts to guard by contract against
the consequences of inflation, it may, nevertheless, be pointed out that,
in spite of the provisions of the gold clause resolution, some measure
of protection is apparently still obtainable in the form of provisions
basing compensation upon commodity prices or similar indices.
82
event, however, shall the additional compensation be computed upon a period beyond the
last day of the calendar or fiscal year in which such death occurs or in which such em-
ployment is terminated as aforesaid."
See also IWooLwoRTH A, 8, and NVOOLWoRTir B, 8, discussed infra note 80.
80. WooLwoRTH A, f 6, and WVooLwoRTH B, T 6, provide for termination by either
party on thirty days' written notice. Each of these contracts provides for the hiring of
a substitute at the employee's expense, in the event of an illness of less than four months
(f18).
81. See It re Paramount Publix Corp., 90 F. (2d) 441 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937) (inter-
preting N. Y. Srocic Coas. LAw, § 60), (1937) 50 Hav. L. Rav. 518.
82. See Nussbaum, Multiple Currency and Index Clauses (1936) 84 U. or P,%. L
Rxv. 569, and Dawson & Coultrap, Contracting by Reference to Price I:diccs (1935)
33 fcH. L. REv. 685. Subsequent to these articles came the decision in Guaranty Trust
Co. v. Henwood, 307 U. S. 247 (1939), 8 GEo. VAs. L. REv. 232, which held that the
gold clause resolution (Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933, 48 STAT. 112) governs domestic
dollar obligations containing alternative provisions for payment in foreign currency. The
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Other Clauses. The contract provisions discussed above- and par-
ticularly those contained in paragraphs 1 through 7- are normally the
only ones included in percentage compensation contracts. However, addi-
tional clauses are occasionally found,8" such as one giving the executive
an expense allowance, 4 protecting his status, 5 providing for arbitration
of difficulties,86 hinting at future rewards,87 making provision as to the
sending of notices by one party to the other,8" and cancelling all previous
agreements between the parties.80 Many corporations have recently
adopted by-laws providing for the indemnification of directors and others
opinion, by Mr. Justice Black, states: "Congress sought to outlaw all contractual pro-
visions which require debtors, who have bound themselves to pay United States dollars,
to pay a greater number of dollars than promised." 307 U. S. 247, 258 (1939). Does
this statement mean that any contract attempting to increase the debtor's obligation, upon
the occurrence of inflation, will be stricken down? It would seem that contracts provid-
ing for the measurement of the obligation in terms of shifting standards of value, such as
shifting commodity price averages, are still valid. In one recently drawn percentage com-
pensation contract with which the writer is familiar, a clause was inserted making the
amount of the executive's monetary participation (though not the percentage rate) fluc-
tuate in accordance with the figure for "all commodities" in the Index of Wholesale Com-
modity Prices published by the United States Department of Labor.
83. The ALLIED contract is unusual in that it contains a covenant to cause a named
subsidiary of the corporation to pay a fixed salary to the executive in addition to the com-
pensation to be paid by the company; it also contains an agreement to pay the executive
a fixed sum annually for life, beginning in 1945. These two provisions introduce additional
problems not necessary to be discussed here.
84. ALLIED, 6: "For each of the fiscal years commencing February 1, 1940, and
terminating January 31, 1945, upon Puckett's written request, Puckett shall receive from
time to time an allowance for entertainment expenses up to but not exceeding Ten Thous-
and Dollars ($10,000) in any such fiscal year."
BURLINGTON, 6: "Love understands and agrees that the services required of him
by this contract in consideration of the salary and additional compensation which are pro-
vided herein include the duty to incur individually, in the interest of the Corporation's
business, certain expenses for entertainment and other like expenses in amounts under all
the circumstances reasonably commensurate with his salary and additional compensation
and his position. When Love is traveling on engagements devoted immediately and di-
rectly to the business of the Corporation, however, he is expected to render expense
accounts which will be paid as such by the Corporation."
85. FEDERATED, ' 6, grants the executive "office space and accommodations and assist-
ants and similar attributes of office suitable to the dignity of his office . . ." The same
contract, ' 2, provides that the executive's duties "shall be substantially the same charac-
ter as those which he has performed for the Employer during the last three (3)
years . . ."
86. COLUMBIA A, I 7, contains an arbitration clause of the standard type.
87. The following provision is fairly typical:
EASTERN, 3: "Notwithstanding this agreement or the provisions hereof, Ricken-
backer shall be eligible for an increase in rate of compensation, if granted by the Cor-
poration or for participation in any extra-compensation or profit-sharing plan which
the Corporation may at any time adopt."
88. BURLINGTON, 8; EASTERN, 9.
89. ALLIED, 9; FEDERATED, 5.
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against litigation and other expense; in the case of such corporations,
parallel indemnification provisions might well be included in the employ-
ment contracts of their executives."
This Article was written to aid the lawyer in dealing with a practical
problem. It will not satisfactorily have fulfilled its purpose, however,
if it has not indicated that the legal practitioner who is called upon to
prepare a profit-sharing contract has a real opportunity to serve the
public interest. That opportunity lies in preparing and seeking to obtain
the adoption of a contract which will be fair to stockholders and man-
agement alike. Some years ago, Mr. Justice Stone referred, in a speech,
to violation of fiduciary duties by corporation managers, mentioning
instances in which they had taken for themselves "huge bonuses from
corporate funds," and added:
"There is little to suggest that the Bar has yet recognized that
it must bear some burden of responsibility for these evils. But when
we know and face the facts we shall have to acknowledge that such
departures from the fiduciary principle do not usually occur with-
out the active assistance of some member of our profession, and that
their increasing recurrence would have been impossible but for the
complaisance of a Bar, too absorbed in the workaday care of private
interests to take account of these events of profound import or to
sound the warning that the profession looks askance upon these, as
things that 'are not done."' 91
The existence of a substantial public sentiment against the use of
percentage compensation contracts cannot be denied. Part of this is
undoubtedly due to the feeling that corporation executives are already
sufficiently well paid, and that the development of the company's earning
power is exactly the thing for which they receive salaries. Anything
additional, it is felt, is in the nature of a gratuity or windfall. Another
reason for this attitude perhaps lies in the fact that we customarily think
of profit-sharing as being coupled with responsibility for losses. A part-
nership, after all, is not a one-sided arrangement; profits are shared, but
so are the risks of the enterprise. The executive's bonus arrangement
looks very much like an attempt to get all the advantages of a partner-
ship without its disadvantages. A parallel is to be found in the law's
treatment of hybrid securities: if we try to give a bondholder voting
rights and a share in the profits, or if we try to give a stockholder a
90. See Washington, Litigation Expenses of Corporate Directors in Sloc:lholdcrs'
Suits (1940) 40 COL. L. REv. 431, 452; Comment (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 1423, 1435;
Washington, The SEC and Directors' Indemnity, soon to be published in the Columbia
Law Review.
91. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar (1934) 48 H~Av. L. Rzv. 1, 9.
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mortgage on the assets in order to secure his stock investment, our efforts
are not- likely to meet with much success. 9 2 Profits, most of us are still
inclined to feel, should go to those who risk their capital and subject
themselves to the possibility of standing a loss. The answer can, of course,
be made that the executive is risking his own talents and earning power.
Technically, also, the mere fact that an employee takes part of his wages
in the form of a share of the profits of the enterprise will not of itself
make him a partner.13 Nevertheless, this underlying feeling persists, and
constitutes one of the reasons why executives' profit-sharing contracts
must be carefully and fairly drawn.
The writer has not attempted to make a case for the universal use of
such contracts. They have many drawbacks, and it is not every business
which can adopt them to advantage. Nevertheless, it is submitted that
a profit-sharing contract fairly drawn and fairly adopted, with careful
observance of the warning given by Mr. Justice Stone, can be and should
be a legitimate source of satisfaction to the legal draftsman.
92. See Stephenson v. Go-Gas Co., 268 N. Y. 372, 380, 197 N. E. 317, 320 (1935);
Uhlman, The Law of Hybrid Securities (1938) 23 WASH. U. L. Q. 182; Comment (1936)
45 YALE L. J. 907.
93. See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT, § 7 (4a). And, of course, "a corporation cannot
enter into a partnership." Compare, however, Stone v. Wright Wire Co., 199 Mass. 306,
308, 85 N. E. 471, 472 (1908).
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